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Abstract. Fraudulent financial reporting practices can have significant consequences for organizations and all 
stakeholders, as well as, for public confidence in the capital and security markets. In fact, comprehensive, 
accurate and reliable financial reporting is the bedrock upon which our markets are based. Keen to project a rosy 
picture of the Satyam to investors, employees and analysts, Mr. Raju (CEO and Chairman) fudged the account 
books so that it appeared to be a far bigger enterprise, with high profits and fast growth rate, than it actually 
was. The Satyam fraud has shattered the dreams of different categories of investors, shocked the government 
and regulators alike, and led to questioning of the accounting practices of statutory auditors and corporate 
governance norms in India. This is an exploratory study based on secondary sources of information. An attempt 
has been made to provide an explanation for various intriguing questions about Satyam scam. After thorough 
investigations by the CBI and SEBI, they have unveiled the methodology by which Satyam fraud was engineered. 
Finally, we recommend “Fraudulent reporting practices should be considered as a serious crime, and accounting 
bodies, courts and other regulatory authorities in India need to adopt very strict punitive measures to stop such 
unethical practices”. 
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Introduction 
Fraudulent financial reporting practices and ac-
counting frauds have occurred in all eras, in all 
countries, and affected many organizations, re-
gardless of their size, location, or industry. In 
nutshell, fraudulent financial reporting is a delib-
erate misstatement in the financial statements 
(FS). It can include the deliberate falsification of 
underlying accounting records, intentionally 
breaching an accounting standard, or knowingly 
omitting transactions, or required disclosures in 
the FS. For example, deliberately not disclosing a 
contingent liability, or significant going concern 
problems in the notes to the financial statements 
means that the disclosures required have inten-
tionally not been made. This is an example of 
fraudulent financial reporting. Thus, financial re-
porting fraud – an intentional, material misrep-
resentation of a company’s financial statements – 
remains a serious concern for investors and 
other capital markets stakeholders. In fact, 
fraudulent financial reporting practices can take 
many forms. For instance, it may entail deliberate 
distortion of corporate records (such as, inven-
tory count tags), or falsified transactions (such as, 
fictitious sales or orders), or misapplication of 
accounting principles. Company employees at 
any level may be involved, from top to middle 
management to lower-level personnel. Undoubt-
edly, fraudulent financial reporting can have sig-
nificant consequences for the organization, 
stakeholder, as well as, for public confidence in 
the capital market. However, fraud impacts or-
ganizations in several areas: financial, opera-
tional and psychological. Corporate accounting 
fraud is not a new thing in this world after the 
debacle of Enron, which proved to be a stimulus 
for others to fancy their own Enron in their re-
spective organizations. “With increasing trend in 
financial crimes across the globe, investors have 
lost their confidence, the credibility of financial 
disclosures is questioned, and companies are also 
facing huge financial losses” [31]. Fortunately, 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and SEBI’s List-
ing Clause 49 in India have done much to im-
prove corporate governance and deter frauds.  
No doubt, recent cases of fraudulent financial re-
porting, accounting frauds and the resultant out-
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cry for transparency and honesty in reporting, 
have given rise to two disparate yet logical out-
comes. Recently, reiterated, “First, ‘forensic’ ac-
counting skills have become crucial in untangling 
the complicated accounting maneuver’s that 
have obfuscated financial statement frauds. Sec-
ond, public demand for change and subsequent 
regulatory action has transformed ‘corporate 
governance’ (henceforth, CG) scenario” [15]. In 
fact, both these trends have the common goal of 
addressing the investors’ concerns about the 
transparent financial reporting system. The fail-
ure of the corporate communication structure 
has made the financial community realize that 
there is a great need for ‘skilled’ professionals 
that can identify, expose, and prevent ‘structural’ 
weaknesses in three key areas: poor CG, flawed 
internal controls, and fraudulent financial state-
ments. “Forensic accounting skills are becoming 
increasingly relied upon within a corporate re-
porting system that emphasizes its accountability 
and responsibility to stakeholders”. 
Satyam Computer Services Limited (henceforth, 
Satyam) was once the crown jewel of Indian IT 
industry, but brought to the ground by its foun-
ders in 2009 as a result of financial crime. The 
debacle of Satyam raised a debate about the role 
of CEO in driving an organization to the heights 
of success, its relation with the board members, 
and role of CG in shaping the protocols related to 
working of audit committee (AC). Thus, an in-
depth case study of Satyam is conducted here to 
analyze the fraudulent accounting reporting 
scam from accounting and top-level management 
perspectives. 
 
Review of Literature 
Several analytical studies, from time to time, have 
been reported in the global media and majority 
of these studies were performed in developed, 
Western countries. Unfortunately, no study has 
been conducted to (a) examine the modus-
operandi of the Satyam, India’s largest corporate 
fraud, and (b) analyze the behavioural aspects of 
top-level management team in the perpetuation 
of corporate frauds in the context of a developing 
economy, like India. However, descriptive paper 
provided good analysis of the Satyam scandal 
[36]. It covered the areas of history of Satyam, 
and also provided an insight into how the $2.7 
billion scandal evaded regulators, investors, and 
the board of directors. The author also provided 
a discussion of who was responsible for the 
fraud, and explained the scandal’s effect in India 
and the implications for dealing with future ob-
stacles. Finally, the author discussed the regula-
tory reforms undertaken following Satyam scam 
and the current status of Indian securities mar-
kets. In another research study performed by 
M. Bhasin [9], “the main objectives were to: (a) 
identify the prominent companies involved in 
fraudulent financial reporting practices, and the 
nature of accounting irregularities they commit-
ted; (b) highlighted the Satyam Computer Lim-
ited’s accounting scandal by portraying the se-
quence of events, the aftermath of events, the key 
parties involved, and major follow-up actions 
undertaken in India; and (c) what lesions can be 
learned from Satyam scam?” Another descriptive 
study by K. Pai and T. Tolleson [28] examined the 
capture of government regulators using the case 
of Satyam Computer Services Limited, one of In-
dia’s largest software and services companies, 
which disclosed a $1.47 billion fraud on its bal-
ance sheet on January 7, 2009. The authors re-
viewed the Satyam fraud and PWC’s failure to 
detect Satyam’s accounting shenanigans, and also 
discussed the societal implications associated 
with a “too big to fail” mentality and the moral 
hazard of such a mindset. In addition, the paper 
provides suggestions to protect the public inter-
est while citing lessons learned from this scandal.  
Similarly, M. Bhasin [13] performed another re-
search study by applying a questionnaire-based 
survey among 345 bank employees to know their 
perception towards bank frauds and evaluate the 
factors that influence the degree of their compli-
ance level. The study reveals that “there are poor 
employment practices and lack of effective em-
ployee training; usually over-burdened staff, 
weak internal control systems, and low compli-
ance levels on the part of Bank Managers, Offices 
and Clerks”. However, an exploratory research 
was conducted by P. Gupta and S. Gupta [21] 
through a combined mode of structured ques-
tionnaires from 346 sample companies and 43 
interviews with the corporate professionals, 
management, investors, government offices and 
authorities having wide experience. They found 
that the regulatory system is weak, there is dire 
need to redefine the role of auditors, coordina-
tion among different regulatory authorities is 
poor, and after every scam, there is a blame 
game”. Recently, M. Bhasin [16] conducted a 
study using a questionnaire-based survey meth-
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odology, where in 14 specific research questions 
were asked. In all, 120 questionnaires were dis-
tributed to the preparers’ and users’ of the com-
pany FS and 85 responses from the participants 
were collected and analyzed using the percent-
age and frequencies of respondents. The study 
revealed that the practice of creative accounting 
(CA) is always a deliberate attempt to gain undue 
advantage for accountants, managers and com-
panies. We recommend that “CA practices should 
be considered as a serious crime, and as such, 
accounting bodies, law courts and other regula-
tory authorities need to adopt very strict punitive 
measures to stop unethical CA practices”. 
Accordingly, the primary objective of this paper 
is to examine managers’ unethical behaviours in 
documented corporate fraud cases, on the basis 
of press articles, which constitute an ex-post 
evaluation of alleged or acknowledged fraud 
cases. Unfortunately, no study has been con-
ducted to examine behavioural aspects of man-
ager’s in the perpetuation of corporate frauds in 
the context of a developing economy, like India. 
Hence, the present study seeks to fill this gap and 
contributes to the literature.  
 
Research Methodology 
Financial reporting practice can be developed by 
reference to a particular setting in which it is 
embedded. Therefore, ‘qualitative’ research 
could be seen useful to explore and describe 
fraudulent financial reporting practice. An at-
tempt has been made by the author to provide a 
brief description about the modus-operandi used 
by the top-level management at Satyam, based on 
reports of various Indian investigative agencies 
and media reports to commit the accounting 
fraud, duly supported by documentary evidence. 
Here, two issues are crucial. First, to understand 
why and how a ‘specific’ company is committed 
to fraudulent financial reporting practice an ap-
propriate “interpretive” research approach is 
needed. Second, case study conducted as part of 
this study, looked specifically at the largest fraud 
case in India, involving Satyam. The Satyam ac-
counting fraud has, for the first time, comprehen-
sively exposed the failure of the regulatory over-
sight mechanism in India. No doubt, to design 
better accounting systems, we need to under-
stand how accounting systems operate in their 
social, political and economic contexts.  
Objectives of Study and Sources of Information. To 
complement prior literature, we examined 
“documented behaviours in cases of corporate 
scandals, using the evidence taken from press 
articles (such as managers’ quotes and journal-
ists’ analyses)”. In terms of information collection 
‘methodology’, we searched for evidence from 
the U.S. press coverage contained in the “Factiva” 
database (also called Dow Jones Factiva). It is a 
non-academic database of international news 
containing 20,000 worldwide full-text publica-
tions including The Financial Times, The Wall 
Street Journal, as well as the continuous informa-
tion from Reuters, Dow Jones, and the Associated 
Press. We also used SEC documents, to under-
stand the technical and accounting aspects of the 
corporate fraud. For some companies, we also 
used the restatement reports. Thus, present 
study is primarily based on “secondary” sources 
of data, (EBSCO host database), gathered from 
the related literature published in the journals, 
newspaper, books, statements, reports. However, 
as stated earlier, the nature of study is “primarily 
qualitative, descriptive and analytical”. However, 
no quantitative and statistical tools have been 
used specifically for analysis of this case study. 
 
Result and Discussion 
Emergence of Satyam. Satyam was a ‘rising-star’ 
in the Indian ‘outsourced’ IT-services industry. 
The company was formed in 1987 in Hyderabad 
(India) by Mr. Ramalinga Raju. The firm began 
with 20 employees, grew rapidly as a ‘global’ 
business, which operated in 65 countries around 
the world. Satyam was the first Indian company 
to be registered with three International Ex-
changes (NYSE, DOW Jones and EURONEXT). 
Satyam was as an example of India’s growing 
success; it won numerous awards for innovation, 
governance, and corporate accountability [1]. As 
M. Bhasin [10] commented, “From 2003-2008, in 
nearly all financial metrics of interest to inves-
tors, the company grew measurably, as summa-
rized in Table 1. Satyam generated Rs. 25,415.4 
million in total sales in 2003-04. By March 2008, 
the company sales revenue had grown by over 
three times. The company demonstrated an an-
nual compound growth rate of 38% over that pe-
riod. Similarly, operating profits, net profit and 
operating cash flows growth averaged 28, 33 and 
35%, respectively”. Thus, Satyam generated sig-
nificant corporate growth and shareholder value 
too. The company was a leading star (and a rec-
ognizable name) in a global IT marketplace. 
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Table 1 – Operating Performance of Satyam: 2003-04 to 2007-2008, Rs. in millions 
Particulars 
2003-
2004 
2004-
2005 
2005-
2006 
2006-
2007 
2007-
2008 
Average Growth Rate 
(%) 
Net Sales 25,415.4 34,642.2 46,343.1 62,284.7 81,372.8 38 
Operating Profit 7,743 9,717 15,714.2 17,107.3 20,857.4 28 
Net Profit 5,557.9 7,502.6 12,397.5 14,232.3 17,157.4 33 
Operating Cash Flow 4,165.5 6,386.6 7,868.1 10,390.6 13,708.7 35 
ROCE (%) 27.95 29.85 31.34 31.18 29.57 30 
ROE (%) 23.57 25.88 26.85 28.14 26.12 26 
Source: www.geogit.com 
 
Ramalinga Raju and Fraudulent Financial Re-
porting Practices at Satyam. Unfortunately, less 
than five months after winning the Global Pea-
cock Award, Satyam became the center-piece of a 
‘massive’ accounting fraud. Satyam’s top-
management simply cooked the company’s 
books by overstating its revenues, profit margins, 
and profits for every single quarter over a period 
of 5-years, from 2003 to 2008. Shockingly, on 
January 7, 2009, Mr. Raju disclosed in a letter 
(Figure 1), “He had been manipulating the com-
pany’s accounting numbers for years. He over-
stated assets on Satyam’s balance sheet by $1.47 
billion, and nearly $1.04 billion in bank loans and 
cash that the company claimed to own was non-
existent. Satyam also under-reported liabilities 
on its balance sheet and overstated its income 
nearly every quarter over the course of several 
years in order to meet analyst expectations”. For 
example, the results announced on October 17, 
2009 overstated quarterly revenues by 75% and 
profits by 97%. Mr. Raju and company’s global 
head of internal audit used a number of different 
techniques to perpetrate the fraud [27].  
As S. Ramachandran [30] pointed out, “Using his 
personal computer, Mr. Raju created numerous 
bank statements to advance the fraud. He falsi-
fied the bank accounts to inflate the balance 
sheet with balances that did not exist. He also in-
flated the income statement by claiming interest 
income from the fake bank accounts. Mr. Raju 
also revealed that He created 6,000 fake salary 
accounts over the past few years and appropri-
ated the money after the company deposited it”. 
As M. Bhasin [18] pointed out, “The Satyam’s 
global head of internal audit created fake cus-
tomer identities and generated fake invoices 
against their names to inflate revenue. The global 
head of internal audit also forged board resolu-
tions and illegally obtained loans for the com-
pany”. It also appeared that the cash that the 
company raised through American Depository 
Receipts in the United States never made it to the 
balance sheets [37].  
Satyam’s Fraudulent Reporting Methodology 
Unveiled. The unfolding of Satyam sage has been 
a watershed event in the Indian corporate his-
tory. According to the founder’s own public con-
fession, Satyam had frequently used fraudulent 
financial reporting practices by inflating its re-
ported revenues by 25%, its operating margins 
by over 10 times, and its cash and bank balance 
by over 1 billion dollars. The magnitude of this 
scam/fraud makes it by far the biggest account-
ing scandal in India’s history [24]. Now, it is good 
to see that the Satyam case is different at least in 
one respect – we now have all the details about 
the modus operandi of the fraud. Shockingly, 
how did Raju mastermind this maze of fraudu-
lent accounting practices at Satyam? Keen to pro-
ject a perpetually rosy picture of the company to 
the investors, employees and analysts, Raju ma-
nipulated and fudged the account books so that it 
appeared a far bigger enterprise and more prof-
itable, than it actually was. Here, M. Bhasin [12] 
remarked, “The Satyam reporting scam is clearly 
a case of abuse of accounting, in which the ac-
counts were ‘cooked-up’ by creating fake in-
voices for the services not rendered, recognizing 
revenue on these fake receipts, falsifying the 
bank balances and interest on fixed deposits to 
show these fake invoices are converted into cash 
receipts and are earning interest, and so on”. 
These types of fraudulent reporting accounting 
practices are both illegal and unethical. In its re-
cent indictment of the former promoters and top 
managers of Satyam, the SEBI and other investi-
gative agencies in India had finally provided 
minute and fascinating details about how India’s 
largest corporate scam was committed.  
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Figure 1 – Satyam’s Founder, Chairman and CEO, Mr. Raju’s Letter to his Board of Directors (pages 1-4) 
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Figure 1 – Satyam’s Founder, Chairman and CEO, Mr. Raju’s Letter to his Board of Directors (page 5) 
 
 
1. Web of Companies. “A web of 356 investment 
companies was used to allegedly divert funds 
from Satyam. Under Ramalinga Raju, Satyam 
floated 327 companies and published inflated 
financials,” said M. Bhasin [15]. These front com-
panies purchased 6,000 acres of land, taken loans 
of Rs. 1,230 crore from these companies, which 
were not even accounted in books. The CID in-
vestigation also revealed that Satyam had exe-
cuted projects in the name of 7 non-existent 
companies. All these companies had several 
transactions in the form of inter-corporate in-
vestments, advances and loans within and among 
them. One such ‘sister’ company, with a paid-up 
capital of Rs. 5 lakh, had made an investment of 
Rs. 90.25 crore, and received unsecured loans of 
Rs. 600 crore.  
2. Cooked-Up Books of Accounts. Raju maintained 
thorough details of the Satyam’s cooked-up ac-
counts and minutes of meetings since 2002. He 
stored records of accounts for the latest year 
(2008-09) in a computer server called “My Home 
Hub”. Details of accounts from 2002 till Jan. 7, 
2009 (the day Mr. Raju came out with his dra-
matic 5-page confession) were stored in two 
separate Internet Protocol (IP) addresses. Keep-
ing in view the media reports, M. Bhasin [17] is of 
firm opinion that “Satyam’s top management 
simply cooked-up the company’s books by over-
stating its revenues, profit margins, profits, ghost 
employees, etc. for every single quarter over a 
period of 5-years, from 2003 to 2008. In his let-
ter, Raju admitted to inflating the cash and bank 
balances of the company by Rs. 5,040 crore. The 
company’s total assets as on Sept. 30, 2008, stood 
at Rs. 8,795 crore. Of this, cash and bank balances 
stood at Rs. 5,313 crore (which was nearly 60% 
of the total assets). This was overstated by Rs. 
5,040 crore. The company basically had cash and 
bank balances of less than Rs. 300 crore”. 
The balance sheet of Satyam (as on 30 Sept., 
2008) carried an inflated (non-existent) cash and 
bank balances of Rs. 5,040 crore, non-existent 
interest of Rs. 376 crore, and understated liability 
of Rs. 1,230 crore. In fact, the balance sheet car-
ried an accrued interest of Rs. 376 crore, which 
was also non-existent. Table 2 depicts some parts 
of the Satyam’s fabricated ‘Balance Sheet and In-
come Statement’ and shows the ‘difference’ be-
tween ‘actual’ and ‘reported’ finances. Keeping in 
view the modus-operandi successfully used by 
Satyam, M. Bhasin [14] remarked: “To show ex-
cess cash, several banks have to be ‘fooled’ (or 
asked to look the other way). To show huge fake 
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revenues, everyone, from sales teams to MIS 
managers to accountants, had to be kept in the 
‘dark’ (or conscripted into the conspiracy). To 
hide it all from investors and analysts, auditors 
had to be ‘fooled’ (or roped in as co-
conspirators). Some surely were. It is frightening 
that such large-scale fraudulent financial report-
ing scam, which is precisely the kind of thing our 
various ‘watchdogs’ are meant to prevent, can be 
perpetrated so casually by just a few people at 
the top!” 
 
Table 2: Fabricated Parts of Balance Sheet and 
Income Statement of Satyam, Rs. 
Indicators Actual Reported Difference 
Cash and Bank 
Balances 
321 5,361 5,040 
Accrued Interest on 
bank FDs 
Nil 376.5 376 
Understated 
Liability 
1,230 None 1,230 
Overstated Debtors 2,161 2,651 490 
Total Nil Nil 7,136 
Revenues (Q2 FY 
2009) 
2,112 2,700 588 
Operating Profits 61 649 588 
 
3. Falsification of Bank’s Fixed Deposits Accounts. 
As M. Bhasin [11] commented, “From the records 
of Satyam, as well as, the books held with the 
auditors, it was noted that two sets of letters of 
confirmation of balances of FDRs were available 
with the auditors. These two sets included con-
firmations actually sent by banks directly to the 
auditors (the genuine ones) in the prescribed 
format, and confirmations through forged letters 
purportedly sent from various bank branches, 
but forged”. Thus, as on 30 Sept. 2008, while the 
actual FDs balances with various banks was just 
under Rs. 10 crore, fake FD receipts shown to the 
auditors totaled over Rs. 3,300 crore. Providing 
an explanation, M. Bhasin [17] described the 
motto and rationale for the process as, “Fake FDs 
had to be generated since fake business had to be 
shown to the stock markets, which meant the 
creation of fake customers and fake invoices 
from these businesses. Fake businesses gener-
ated fake revenues which, in turn, created the 
illusion of fake profit margins, and, finally, fake 
cash in the bank. Satyam apparently was very 
poor on its business fundamentals – with mar-
gins being low in many quarters, including nega-
tive margins in some quarters”. Indeed, falsifica-
tion with regards to fixed deposit have been done 
since 2001-02 till 2007-08 and also for the quar-
ter ended June 2008 and Sept. 2008.  
4. Fake Invoices. M. Bhasin [16] stated, “Docu-
ments showed how the Satyam’s standard billing 
systems were subverted to generate ‘false’ in-
voices to show ‘inflated’ sales, before its former 
boss, Raju, admitted to his role in the corporate 
scandal. The Satyam scandal involved this system 
structure being bypassed by the abuse of an 
emergency ‘Excel Porting System’, which allows 
invoices to be generated directly in IMS…by port-
ing the data into the IMS”. This system was sub-
verted by the creation of a user ID called ‘Super 
User’ with “the power to hide/unhide the in-
voices generated in IMS”. The investigators had 
used cyber forensics to uncover how in-house 
computer systems were exploited to generate 
fake invoices. Regular Satyam bills were created 
by a computer application called ‘Operational 
Real Time Management (OPTIMA)’, which cre-
ated and maintained information on all company 
projects. The ‘Satyam Project Repository (SRP)’ 
system then generated project IDs; there is also 
an ‘Ontime’ application for entering the hours 
worked by Satyam employees; and a ‘Project Bill 
Management System (PBMS)’ for billing. An ‘In-
voice Management System (IMS)’ generated the 
final invoices. There were about 74,625 invoices 
generated in the IMS between April 2003 and 
Dec. 2008. The CBI found that “sales were in-
flated every quarter and the average inflation in 
sales was about 18% [29].  
5. Showing Fake Employees. To quote M. Bhasin 
[8], “One of the biggest sources of defalcation at 
Satyam was the inflation of the number of em-
ployees. Founder chairman of Satyam, Raju 
claimed that the company had 53,000 employees 
on its payroll. But according to investigators, the 
real number was around 43,000. The ficti-
tious/ghost number of employees could be fabri-
cated because payment to the remaining 13,000 
employees was faked year-after-year: an opera-
tion that evidently involved the creation of bogus 
companies with a large number of employees”. 
The money, in the form of salaries paid to ghost 
employees, came to around $4 million a month, 
which was diverted through front companies and 
through accounts belonging to one of Mr. Raju’s 
brothers and his mother to buy thousands of 
acres of land. Making up ghost employees might 
sound complicated, but investigators said it was 
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not that difficult. “Employees are just code num-
bers in Satyam system; it can create any amount 
of them by creating bogus employee IDs with 
false address, time-sheets, opening fake salary 
accounts with banks, and collecting payments 
through an accomplice”.  
6. Lax Board of Directors. The Satyam Board was 
composed of “chairman-friendly” directors, who 
failed to question the management’s strategy and 
use of leverage in recasting the company. More-
over, they were also extremely slow to act when 
it was already clear that the company was in fi-
nancial distress. Here, M. Bhasin [6] observed, 
“The directors acted as mere rubber-stamps and 
the promoters were always present to influence 
the decision. The glue that held the board mem-
bers together was Mr. Raju (Chairman). Each of 
the board members were there on his personal 
invitation and that made them ineffective. The 
Board ignored, or failed to act on, critical infor-
mation related to financial wrong-doings before 
the company ultimately collapsed”. It was only 
when Raju in the Dec. 2008 announced a $1.6 bil-
lion bid for two Maytas companies (Maytas Infra 
and Maytas Properties) and while the share mar-
ket reacted very strongly against the bid and 
prices plunged by 55% on concerns about Sat-
yam’s CG, that some of the IDs came into action 
by announcing their withdrawal from the Board, 
by than it was too late.  
Satyam board’s decision to invest 1.6 billion dol-
lars to acquire a 100% stake in Maytas Proper-
ties and 51% stake in Maytas Infrastructure (the 
two real estate firms promoted by Raju’s sons) 
was in gross violation of the Companies Act 1956, 
under which no company is allowed, without 
shareholder’s approval to acquire directly or in-
directly any other corporate entity that is valued 
at over 60% of its paid-up capital. “Yet, Satyam’s 
directors went along with the decision, raising 
only technical and procedural questions about 
SEBI’s guidelines and the valuation of the Maytas 
companies. They did not even refer to the conflict 
of interest in buying companies in a completely 
unrelated business, floated by the chairman’s 
relatives,” remarked M. Bhasin [7]. Indeed, one of 
the independent directors even praised the mer-
its of real-estate investment on Satyam’s part.  
7. Unconvincing Role of Independent Directors. 
With regard to the role of the ‘independent’ di-
rectors (IDs) at Satyam, we should understand: 
how ‘independent’ they actually were? It was 
seen that all the non-executive directors (NEDs) 
at Satyam have been allotted significant stock 
options at an unbelievable low strike price of Rs. 
2 per share. Apart from this, all the NEDs have 
also earned handsome commissions during 
2007-08, as reflected by Satyam’s audited results. 
Naturally, a basic question arises here: “how can 
directors who had enjoyed such a huge largesse 
from the Company’s promoters, had been benefi-
ciaries of stock options given at an unbelievable 
strike price of Rs. 2 per share (against the ruling 
price of Rs. 500 per share in 2007- 08), and who 
had received such high commissions could be 
expected to be ‘independent’? According to 
M. Bhasin [5], “The idea of giving stock options to 
the IDs, was an intelligent ploy by Raju to suc-
cessfully implement his plot at Satyam, with little 
resistance from the so-called independent direc-
tors, to whom, he was supposed to report to. It 
sounds ridiculous to listen to some of the IDs at 
the Press interviews (post-scandal) that they 
were not aware of what was going on at Satyam”. 
“Satyam scam is one more proof that the mere 
compliance of SEBI’s rule of the minimum num-
ber of independent directors does not guarantee 
ethical practices. Corporate history of the past 
decade has more than clearly shown that inde-
pendent directors have not served their pur-
pose,” stated M. Bhasin [4].  
8. Tunneling Strategy Used by Satyam. As part of 
their “tunneling” strategy, the Satyam promoters 
had substantially reduced their holdings in com-
pany from 25.6% (in Mar. 2001) to 8.74% (in 
Mar. 2008). Furthermore, as the promoters held 
a very small percentage of equity (mere 2.18%) 
on Dec. 2008, as shown in Table 3, the concern 
was that poor performance would result in a 
takeover bid, thereby exposing the gap. Here, 
M. Bhasin [9] reports, “The aborted Maytas ac-
quisition deal was the final, desperate effort to 
cover up the accounting fraud by bringing in 
some real assets into the business. When that 
failed, Raju confessed the fraud. Given the stake 
the Raju’s held in Matyas, pursuing the deal 
would not have been terribly difficult from the 
perspective of the Raju family”.  
As pointed out by S. Shirur [33], “Unlike Enron, 
which sank due to agency problem, Satyam was 
brought to its knee due to tunneling. The com-
pany with a huge cash pile, with promoters still 
controlling it with a small per cent of shares (less 
than 3%), and trying to absorb a real-estate 
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company in which they have a majority stake is a 
deadly combination pointing prima facie to tun-
neling”. The reason why Raju claims that he did it 
was because every year he was fudging revenue 
figures, and since expenditure figures could not 
be fudged so easily, the gap between ‘actual’ 
profit and ‘book’ profit got widened every year. 
In order to close this gap, he had planned to buy 
Maytas Infrastructure and Maytas Properties. In 
this way, ‘fictitious’ profits could be absorbed 
through a ‘self-dealing’ process. M. Bhasin [3] 
concludes, “The auditors, bankers, and SEBI, the 
market watchdog, were all blamed for their role 
in the accounting fraud”. 
 
Table 3 – Promoter’s Shareholding pattern in Satyam 
(in %-age) 
Years Particulars 
2001, March 25.6 
2002, March 22.26 
2003, March 20.74 
2004, March 17.35 
2005, March 15.67 
2006, March 14.02 
2007, March 8.79 
2008, March 8.74 
2008, December 2.18 
 
9. Insider Trading Activities. Investigations into 
Satyam scam by the CID of the State Police and 
Central agencies have established that “the pro-
moters indulged in nastiest kind of insider trad-
ing of the company’s shares to raise money for 
building a large land bank”. According to the SFIO 
Report findings, “promoters of Satyam and their 
family members during April 2000 to January 7, 
2009 sold almost 3.9 crore number of shares 
thereby collecting in Rs. 3029.67 crore. During 
this course, the founder ex-chairman Ramalinga 
Raju sold 98 lakh shares collecting in Rs. 773.42 
crores, whereas, his brother Rama Raju, sold 1.1 
crore shares pocketing Rs. 894.32 crores”. Find-
ing these top managers guilty of unfair manipula-
tion of stock prices and insider trading, SEBI has 
asked them to deposit their ‘unlawful gains’ of Rs. 
1850 crore, with 12% interest, with the regulator 
within 45 days. They have also been barred from 
associating with the securities markets in any 
manner for the next 14 years. 
10. Gaps in Satyam’s Earnings and Cash Flows. Af-
ter careful analysis, we can see there is no real 
difference in the trends in Satyam’s net income 
and its cash flow from operations during 2004 
and 2005, as shown in Figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 2 – Satyam’s Earnings and Cash Flow,  
2004-2008 
 
Both net income and cash flow lines were almost 
overlapping each other. That is not because the 
earnings were genuine; it is because the cash 
flows were manipulated too. To do that, Raju’s 
team had to forge several big amount accounts 
receivables, and simultaneously falsify about 
their cash collections. Thus, the fake cash flows 
had led to the bogus bank balances. However, 
wide gaps can be noticed in net income and cash 
flow from operation during 2006, 2007 and 
2008, respectively. “During 2006 to 2008, cash 
flows were far less than net income due to ac-
counting manipulations. Indeed, Satyam fraud 
was a stunningly and very cleverly articulated 
comprehensive fraud, likely to be far more exten-
sive than what happened at Enron,” said 
M. Bhasin [14]. 
11. Fake Audit and Dubious Role Played by Audi-
tor’s. Many experts cast partial blame for the ac-
counting scandal on Satyam’s auditor ‘Price 
Waterhouse (PwC)’ India, because the fraud 
went undetected for so many years. In fact, global 
auditing firm used Lovelock and Lewis (as their 
agent), who audited the Satyam’s books of ac-
counts from June 2000 until the discovery of the 
fraud in 2009. Several commentators criticized 
PwC harshly for failing to detect the fraud [36]. 
However, Raju’s admission of having fudged the 
accounts for several years put the role of these 
statutory auditors on the dock. 
The SFIO Report stated, “Statutory auditors in-
stead of using an ‘independent’ testing mecha-
nism used Satyam’s investigative tools and 
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thereby compromised on reporting standards”. 
PwC did not check even 1% of the invoices; nei-
ther did they pay enough attention to verification 
of sundry debtors, which (according to Raju’s 
confession) was overstated by 23% (SFIO report 
says it was overstated by almost 50%). The 
Statutory auditors also failed in discharging their 
duty when it came to independently verifying 
cash and bank balances, both current account 
and fixed deposits. Hence, it was required that 
the PwC auditors independently check with the 
banks on the existence of Fixed Deposit’s, but this 
was not done for as large as a sum of Rs. 5,040 
crore. “The statutory auditors on whom the gen-
eral public relied on for accurate information not 
only failed in their job but themselves played a 
part in perpetrating fraud by preparing a clean 
audit report for fudged, manipulated and cooked 
books,” concluded Bhasin (2012).  
It is shocking to know that “PwC outsourced the 
audit function to a local audit firm, Lovelock and 
Lewis, without the approval of Satyam”. Unfortu-
nately, the PwC audited the company for nearly 9 
years and did not uncover the fraud, whereas 
Merrill Lynch discovered the fraud as part of its 
due diligence in merely 10 days. Missing these 
“red-flags” implied either that the auditors were 
grossly inept or in collusion with the company in 
committing the fraud. The CBI, which investi-
gated the case, also charged the two auditors 
with complicity in the commission of the fraud by 
consciously overlooking the accounting irregu-
larities. On April 22, 2014 “The Institute of Char-
tered Accountants of India (ICAI)” has imposed a 
life-time ban on four auditors involved in the 
Satyam CA fraud. A penalty of Rs. 5 lakh each was 
also levied on them. Strangely, Satyam’s auditor, 
PwC, got away with a rap on its knuckles. 
12. Abnormal Audit Fees Paid to PwC India Agent. 
A point has also been raised about the unjustified 
increase in audit fees. Table 4 shows that over a 
period of four years, 2004-05 to 2007-08, the au-
dit fee increased by 5.7 times, whereas total in-
come increased by 2.47 times during the same 
period. Here, Bhasin (2013) remarked, “Satyam 
also paid PwC twice what other firms would 
charge for the audit, which raised questions 
about whether PwC was complicit in the fraud”. 
The Chairman of the AC’s in the relevant years 
should have been interrogated by the investiga-
tors as to what justification did the AC have for 
recommending such a hike?  
Table 4 – Satyam’s Total Income and Audit Fees 
(Rs. in Millions) 
Indicators 
Years 
2004-
2005 
2005-
2006 
2006-
2007 
2007-
2008 
Total 
Income 
(A) 
35,468 50,122.2 64,100.8 83,944.8 
Audit Fees 
(B) 
6.537 11.5 36.7 37.3 
% of B to 
A 
0.0184 0.0229 0.0573 0.0444 
Source: Annual Reports of Satyam, Percentage 
computed 
 
The PwC received an annual fee of Rs. 37.3 mil-
lion for financial year 2007-2008, which is almost 
twice, as what Satyam peers (i.e., TCS, Infosys, 
Wipro), on an average, pay their auditors. Bhasin 
(2015) stated, “This shows that the auditors 
were being lured by the monetary incentive to 
certify the cooked and manipulated financial 
statements. Events of such nature raised doubts 
about statutory auditors’ discharging their duty 
independently”. Consequently, on 24th Jan. 2009, 
two senior partners of PwC, Mr. S. Gopalakrishna 
and Mr. Srinivas Talluri were booked by Andhra 
Pradesh CID police on charges of fraud and 
criminal conspiracy. Also, the PwC had sus-
pended the two partners, who signed on Sat-
yam’s balance sheet and are currently in prison.  
13. Questionable Role of the Audit Committee. Re-
cently, Bhasin (2016d) observed, “Surprisingly, 
the failure to detect the Satyam fraud is ‘unimag-
inable’ because it involved violating basic ‘audit’ 
procedures. Auditing ‘cash’ is so basic that people 
do not think twice about accepting the number, 
never thinking to ask questions about it”. Still, a 
basic question arises: “Where was the Audit 
Committee (AC)?” As AC member, the directors 
have full-access to the auditors and right and re-
sponsibility to question the audit team. For in-
stance, in the Satyam case after seeing an accu-
mulated $1 billion on the books, the AC should 
have raised questions about “what the company 
planned to do with the cash, or how much it was 
earning on the money, and so on”. Moreover, 
Bhasin (2015) observed that “the timely action 
on the information supplied by a whistleblower 
to the chairman and members of the AC (an e-
mail dated December 18, 2008 by Jose Abraham), 
could serve as an SOS to the company, but they 
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chose to keep silent and did not report the matter 
to the shareholders or the regulatory authori-
ties”.  
Aftermath of Satyam Scandal. The news of the 
fraudulent financial reporting practices followed 
by Satyam sent jitters through the Indian stock 
market, and Sensex index fell more than 5% and 
also Satyam shares fell by more than 70%. Fol-
lowing the shocking disclosures by Mr. Raju 
(Chairman), the traders counter saw frantic sell-
ing on the bourses and nearly 143 million shares 
(or a quarter of the total 575 million shares) had 
changed hands and finally, the shares closed 
down 77.69% at Rs. 39.95 at the Bombay Stock 
Exchange (BSE), wiping out Rs.139.15 per share 
in a single day. After Wednesday’s fall, the firm’s 
market value has sunk to little more than $500 
million from around $7 billion as recently as last 
June. The stock that hit its all-time high of Rs. 542 
in 2008 crashed to an unimaginable Rs. 6.30 on 
the day Raju confessed on Jan. 9, 2009. Satyam’s 
shares fell to 11.50 rupees on Jan. 10, 2009, their 
lowest level since March 1998, compared to a 
high of Rs. 544 in 2008. In the New York Stock 
Exchange, Satyam shares peaked in 2008 at US$ 
29.10; by March 2009 they were trading around 
US $1.80. Thus, investors lost $2.82 billion in Sat-
yam.  
Just a year later, the scam-hit Satyam was 
snapped up by Tech Mahindra for a mere Rs. 58 
per share – a market cap of mere Rs. 5,600 crore. 
In the aftermath of Satyam, India’s markets re-
covered and Satyam now lives on. India’s stock 
market is currently trading near record highs, as 
it appears that a global economic recovery is tak-
ing place. Civil litigation and criminal charges 
continue against Satyam. As Shubhashish (2015) 
concluded, “On 13 April 2009, via a formal public 
auction process, a 46% stake in Satyam was pur-
chased by Mahindra & Mahindra owned com-
pany Tech Mahindra, as part of its diversification 
strategy. Effective July 2009, Satyam rebranded 
its services under the new Mahindra manage-
ment as Mahindra Satyam. After a delay due to 
tax issues, Tech Mahindra announced its merger 
with Mahindra Satyam on 21 March 2012, after 
the board of two companies gave the approval. 
The companies are merged legally on 25 June 
2013”. As D. Winkler [36] states, “With the right 
changes, India can minimize the rate and size of 
accounting fraud in the Indian capital markets”. 
 
Investigation into the Satyam Case: Criminal & 
Civil Charges. The Indian government immedi-
ately started an investigation, while at the same 
time limiting its direct participation. The gov-
ernment appointed a ‘new’ board of directors for 
Satyam to try to save the company: goal was to 
sell the company within 100 days [26]. On 7 Jan. 
2009, the SEBI commenced investigations under 
the various SEBI regulations. The Ministry of 
Corporate Affairs (MCA) of the Central Govern-
ment separately initiated a fraud investigation 
through its Serious Fraud Investigation Office 
(SFIO). In addition, the MCA filed a petition be-
fore the Company Law Board (CLB) to prevent 
the existing directors from acting on the Board 
and to appoint new directors. On 9 Jan. 2009, the 
CLB suspended the current directors of Satyam 
and allowed the Government to appoint up to 10 
new “nominee” directors. Subsequently, the new, 
six-member Board had appointed a chief execu-
tive officer and external advisors, including the 
accounting firms KPMG and Deloitte to restate 
the accounts of Satyam. 
“The Satyam fraudulent financial reporting 
scam/fraud has highlighted the multiplicity of 
regulators, courts and regulations involved in a 
serious offence by a listed-company in India. The 
lengthy and complicated investigations that were 
followed up after the revelation of the fraud has 
led to charges against several different groups of 
people involved with Satyam,” says M. Bhasin [9]. 
Indian authorities arrested Mr. Raju, Mr. B. Ramu 
Raju (Raju’s brother), its former managing direc-
tor, Mr. Srinivas Vdlamani, the company’s head of 
internal audit, and its CFO on criminal charges of 
fraud. Indian authorities also arrested and 
charged several of the company’s auditors (PwC) 
with fraud. The Institute of Chartered Account-
ants of India (ICAI 2009) ruled that “the CFO and 
the auditor were guilty of professional miscon-
duct”. 
All the accused involved in the Satyam fraud case 
were charged with cheating, criminal conspiracy, 
forgery, breach of trust, inflating invoices and 
profits, faking accounts and violating number of 
income tax laws. The CBI had filed three charge-
sheets in the case, which were later clubbed into 
one massive charge-sheet running over 55,000 
pages. Over 3000 documents and 250 witnesses 
were parsed over the past 6 years. A special CBI 
court on April 9, 2015 finally, sentenced Mr. B. 
Ramalinga Raju, his two brothers and seven oth-
ers to seven years in prison in the Satyam fraud 
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case. The court also imposed a fine of Rs. 5 crore 
on Ramalinga Raju, the Satyam founder and for-
mer chairman, and his brother B. Rama Raju, and 
Rs. 20-25 lakh each on the remaining accused 
[25]. The 10 people found guilty in the case are: 
B. Ramalinga Raju; his brother and Satyam’s for-
mer managing director B. Rama Raju; former 
chief financial officer Vadlamani Srinivas; former 
PwC auditors Subramani Gopalakrishnan and T. 
Srinivas; Raju’s another brother, B Suryanara-
yana Raju; former employees (G. Ramakrishna, D. 
Venkatpathi Raju and Ch. Srisailam); and Sat-
yam’s former internal chief auditor V.S. Prab-
hakar Gupta.  
 
Conclusion and Recommendation 
Satyam, a global IT-company based in India, has 
just been added to a notorious list of companies 
involved in fraudulent financial reporting prac-
tices. Satyam’s CEO and Chairman, Mr. B. Rama-
lingam Raju, took the final responsibility for all 
the accounting improprieties. “This leads one to 
ask a simple question: How does this keep on 
happening for five years, without any suspi-
cions?” asked M. Bhasin [17]. So, while Raju ran 
his fraud, the auditor slept, the analysts slept, and 
so did the media. To be fair, finally, the media and 
a whistle-blower did an excellent job of exposing 
Raju and his many other “shenanigans” after he 
had confessed. In his letter (of Jan. 7, 2009) ad-
dressed to board of directors of Satyam, Raju 
showed the markers of this fraud ‘pathology’. 
Now, more than six years later, the final decision 
in the Satyam scam has been made and all ac-
cused charge-sheeted in the case have been 
awarded punishment by the Court.  
The Satyam fraudulent financial reporting scam 
is a glaring example of ‘abuse’ of accounting, in 
which the account books were cooked up. Re-
cently, M. Bhasin [16] lucidly pointed out that 
“the culture at Satyam (especially dominated by 
the board) symbolized an unethical culture”. This 
scam brought to light the role of CG in shaping 
the protocols related to the working of Audit 
Committee and duties of Board members. Now, it 
is amply clear that the Satyam scam was plotted 
at the top and driven by Ramalinga Raju and his 
brother. They were the key players in the plot to 
falsify the accounts and hide the bottom-line 
truth from everyone. It is also clear that all the 
culprits – from Raju down to the finance guys – 
did everything possible to give SEBI and other 
investigative agencies a run-around and delay 
the verdict. This is what explains, why it took 
more than five-and-a-half years to close an open-
and-shut-case. It took nearly 2 years, involve-
ment of multitude of investigation agencies, and 
over 200 experts to assess the total damage of 
the scam perpetrated by Raju. Now, the final fig-
ure is a shade under Rs. 8,000 crore. A special 
CBI Court in Hyderabad on April 9, 2015 finally, 
sentenced all the 10 people involved in the multi-
crore accounting scam found guilty of cheating, 
forgery, destruction of evidence and criminal 
breach of trust, almost the six-year-old case has 
reached its logical conclusion. Undoubtedly, the 
Indian government took quick actions to protect 
the interest of the investors, safeguard the credi-
bility of India, and the nation’s image across the 
world.  
According to A. Chopra [20], President of ICAI, 
“The Satyam scam was not an accounting or au-
diting failure, but one of CG. This apex body 
found the two PwC auditors ‘prima-facie’ guilty 
of professional misconduct”. The CBI also 
charged the two auditors with complicity in the 
commission of the fraud by consciously over-
looking the accounting irregularities. As 
A. Krishnan [26] pointed out, “Yet both Satyam’s 
internal as well as statutory auditors did not 
bring it to anyone’s notice. Well, the internal 
auditor hauled up by SEBI has frankly admitted 
that he did notice differences in the amounts 
billed to big clients, such as Citigroup and Agilent, 
when he scoured Satyam’s computerized ac-
counts. But when he flagged this with Satyam’s 
finance team, he was fobbed off with the assur-
ance that the accounts would be ‘reconciled’. 
Later, he was ‘assured’ that the problem had 
been fixed”. We strongly recommend that 
“Fraudulent financial reporting practices should 
be considered as a serious crime, and as such, 
accounting bodies, law courts and other regula-
tory authorities in India need to adopt very strict 
punitive measures to stop such unethical prac-
tices”. According to the Association of Certified 
Fraud Examiner’s Report to the Nations [2], 
“Their survey estimated that the typical organi-
zation loses 5% of revenues in a given year as a 
result of fraud… India ranks second in terms of 
victim organizations reporting fraud cases”. Fi-
nally, the responsibility of preventing, detecting 
and investigating corporate and financial frauds 
rests squarely on Board of Directors and this re-
quires them to adopt preventive steps. Also, the 
Board of Directors and top-management should 
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jointly agree and define their anti-fraud strategy, 
establish appropriate fraud mitigation steps, and 
train their employees to combat financial and 
corporate frauds. Shockingly, no full-proof sys-
tem could be developed, so far, by the multiple 
local and international regulatory bodies across 
the globe. Hence, the global corporate stake-
holders’ “dubs the rising cases and magnitude of 
frauds as an inevitable cost of doing business”. 
Although, corporate world cannot be 100% se-
cure against unknown threats, a certain level of 
preparedness can go a long way in countering 
fraud risks. 
 
References 
 
1. Agrawal, S. & Sharma, R. (2009, January 10). Beat this: Satyam won awards for corporate 
governance. VCCircle Network. Retrieved from 
http://www.vccircle.com/news/technology/2009/01/09/beat-satyam-won-awards-corp-
governance-internal-audit 
2. ACFE. (2016). Report to the Nations on Occupational Fraud and Abuse: 2012 Global Fraud Study. Re-
trieved from http://www.acfe.com/uploadedFiles/ACFE_Website/Content/rttn/2012-report-to-
nations.pdf 
3. Bhasin, M. L. (2007). Forensic Accounting: A New Paradigm for Niche Consulting. The Chartered Ac-
countant, Jan., 1000–1010. Retrieved from http://resource.cdn.icai.org/97231000-1010.pdf 
4. Bhasin, M. L. (2008). Corporate Governance and Role of the Forensic Accountant. The Chartered Sec-
retary, 38(10), 1361–1368. 
5. Bhasin, M. L. (2010). Corporate Governance Disclosure Practices: The Portrait of a Developing Coun-
try. International Journal of Business and Management, 5(4), 150–167. doi 
10.5539/ijbm.v5n4p150 
6. Bhasin, M. L. (2011). Corporate Governance Disclosure Practices: The Portrait of a Developing Coun-
try. International Review of Business Research Papers, 7(1), 393–419.  
7. Bhasin, M. L. (2012). Corporate Accounting Frauds: A Case Study of Satyam Computers Limited. In-
ternational Journal of Contemporary Business Studies, 3(10), 16–42. 
8. Bhasin, M. L. (2012). Audit Committee Mechanism to Improve Corporate Governance: Evidence from 
a Developing Country. Modern Economy, 3(11), 856–872. doi 10.4236/me.2012.37109 
9. Bhasin, M. L. (2013). Corporate Accounting Scandal at Satyam: A Case Study of India’s Enron. Euro-
pean Journal of Business and Social Sciences, 1(12), 25–47. 
10. Bhasin, M. L. (2013). Corporate Accounting Fraud: A Case Study of Satyam Computer Limited. Open 
Journal of Accounting, 2(2), 26–38. doi 10.4236/ojacct.2013.22006  
11. Bhasin, M. L. (2013). Corporate Governance and Role of the Forensic Accountant: An Exploratory 
Study of an Asian Country. Amity Business Review, 14(1), 48–71. 
12. Bhasin, M. L. (2015). Forensic Accounting: Perspectives and Prospects. Pakistan Accountant, Oct.–
Dec., 44–48. 
13. Bhasin, M. L. (2015). Menace of Frauds in Banking Industry: Experience of a Developing Country. 
Australian Journal of Business and Management Research, 4(12), 21–33. Retrieved from 
http://www.ajbmr.com/files/download/adee1c0429515a4 
14. Bhasin, M. L. (2015). Creative Accounting Practices in the Indian Corporate Sector: An Empirical 
Study. International Journal of Management Science and Business Research, 4(10), 35–52. Re-
trieved from http://thejournalofbusiness.org/index.php/site/article/view/948/610 
15. Bhasin, M. L. (2016). Debacle of Satyam Computers Limited: A Case Study of India’s Enron. Wulfenia 
Journal, 23(3), 124–162.  
16. Bhasin, M. L. (2016). Survey of Creative Accounting Practices: An Empirical Study. Wulfenia Journal, 
23(1), 143–162. 
17. Bhasin, M. L. (2016). Unethical Creative Accounting Culture at Satyam Computers Limited: A Case 
Study of India’s Enron. International Journal of Business and Social Research, 6(7), 24–48.  
18. Bhasin, M. L. (2016). Strengthening Corporate Governance through an Audit Committee: An Em-
pirical Study. Wulfenia Journal, 23(2), 2–27.  
19. Bhasin, M. L. (2016). Contribution of Forensic Accounting to Corporate Governance: An Exploratory 
TRAEKTORIÂ NAUKI / PATH OF SCIENCE       www.pathofscience.org 
International Electronic Scientific Journal. 2016. Vol. 2, No 10       ISSN 2413-9009 
Section “Economics”   1.20 
Study of an Asian Country. International Business Management, 10(4), 479–492. Retrieved from 
http://www.isihome.ir/freearticle/ISIHome.ir-24088.pdf 
20. Chopra, A. (2011, January 25). Satyam fraud, not an accounting failure: ICAI. Business Standard. Re-
trieved from http://www.business-standard.com/article/economy-policy/satyam-fraud-not-an-
accounting-failure-icai-111012500023_1.html 
21. Gupta, P. K. & Gupta, S. (2015). Corporate frauds in India: Perceptions and emerging issues. Journal 
of Financial Crime, 22(1), 79–103. doi 10.1108/JFC–07–2013–0045 
22. ICAI finds ex Satyam CFO, Price Waterhouse auditors guilty. (2009, September 28). The Hindu. Re-
trieved from http://www.thehindu.com/business/Industry/icai-finds-exsatyam-cfo-price-
waterhouse-auditors-guilty/article26189.ece 
23. ICAI. (2014, April 22). The Institute of Chartered Accountants of India has imposed a life-time ban 
on four auditors. Retrieved from http://m.scirp.org/papers/70827 
24. India’s Satyam Scandal: A Blessing in Disguise? (2015, December 20). China India Institute. Re-
trieved from http://www.chinaindiainstitute.com/indias-satyam-scandal-a-blessing-in-disguise-
2 
25. Kaul, V. (2015, April 10). Satyam scam: Ramalinga Raju, the man who knew too much, gets 7 years 
in jail. F. Business. Retrieved from http://www.firstpost.com/business/satyam-scam-ramalinga-
raju-the-man-who-knew-too-much-gets-7-years-in-jail-2190739.html 
26. Krishnan, A. (2014, July 18). Finally, the truth about Satyam. The Hindu Business Line. Retrieved 
from http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/opinion/columns/aarati-krishnan/finally-the-
truth-about-satyam/article6225718.ece 
27. Miller, G. S. (2006). The press as a watchdog for accounting fraud. Journal of Accounting Research. 
44(5), 1001– 1033. doi 10.1111/j.1475-679X.2006.00224.x 
28. Pai, K. & Tolleson, T.D. (2015). India’s Satyam Scandal: Evidence the too Large to Indict Mindset of 
Accounting Regulators is a Global Phenomenon. Review of Business and Finance Studies, 6(2), 35–
43. Retrieved from https://bibliotecausatpdqt.files.wordpress.com/2014/12/indias-satyam-
scandal_evidence-the-too-large-to-indict-mindset-of-accounting-regulators-is-a-global-
phenomenon.pdf 
29. Ramana, K. V. (2009, April 15). 7,561 fake invoices = Rs. 5,117 crore sales. DNA. Retrieved from 
http://www.dnaindia.com/money/report-7561-fake-bills-rs-5117-cr-sales-1247889 
30. Ramachadran, S. (2009). Raju brings down Satyam, shakes India. Retrieved from 
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/KA09Df01.html 
31. Reurink, A. (2016). Financial Fraud: A Literature Review. MPIfG Discussion Paper, 16/5. Retrieved 
from https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/141282/1/859161242.pdf 
32. SFIO. (2009). SFIO Report published in the Pioneer. New Delhi, India: n. d. 
33. Shirur, S. (2011). Tunneling vs. Agency Effect: A Case Study of Enron and Satyam. Vikalpa, 36(3), 9–
20. Retrieved from http://www.vikalpa.com/pdf/articles/2011/Pages-from-Vikalpa36-3-9-
20.pdf 
34. Shubhashish. (2015, April 9). All that you need to know about the Satyam Scam. DNA. Retrieved 
from http://www.dnaindia.com/money/report-all-that-you-need-to-know-about-the-satyam-
scam-2067138 
35. Brown, V., Daugherty, B., & Persellin, J. (2014). Satyam Fraud: A Case Study of India’s Enron. Issues 
in Accounting Education, 29(3), 419–442. doi 10.2308/iace-50735 
36. Winkler, D. (2010, March 30). India’s Satyam Accounting Scandal. Retrieved from: 
http://blogs.law.uiowa.edu/ebook/content/uicifd-briefing-paper-no-8-indias-satyam-
accounting-scandal 
37. Knowledge@Wharton (2009, January 09). Scandal at Satyam: Truth, Lies and Corporate Govern-
ance. Retrieved from http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/scandal-at-satyam-truth-
lies-and-corporate-governance 
© M. L. Bhasin 
 
Received 2016-10-01, Accepted 2016-10-12, Published online 2016-10-16 
ТРАЕКТОРИЯ НАУКИ        www.pathofscience.org 
Международный электронный научный журнал. 2016. Т. 2, № 10     ISSN 2413-9009 
Раздел «Экономические науки»    1.21 
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Аннотация. Мошеннические практика финансовой отчетности может иметь серьезные последствия для 
организаций и всех заинтересованных сторон, а также, для общественного доверия в столице и 
безопасности рынков. На самом деле, исчерпывающая, точная и надежная финансовая отчетность 
является основой, на которой базируются наши рынки. Движимый желанием создать радужную 
картину компании Satyam для инвесторов, сотрудников и аналитиков, г-н Raju (генеральный директор и 
председатель) подделал отчетность таким образом, чтобы предприятие казалась более крупным, чем 
на самом деле, с более высокой прибылью и быстрыми темпами роста. Мошенничество Satyam 
разрушило мечты разных категорий инвесторов, шокировало правительство и регулирующие органы и 
привело к расследованию практики бухгалтерского учета, аудита и норм корпоративного управления в 
Индии. Это предварительное исследование проведено на основе вторичных источников информации. 
Дано объяснение различным вопросам, касающимся жульничества Satyam. После тщательного 
расследования со стороны CBI и SEBI, была представлена методология, с помощью которой было 
спроектировано мошенничество Satyam. И, наконец, мы рекомендуем: «Мошеннические практики 
отчетности следует рассматривать как серьезное преступление, и бухгалтерские органы, суды и другие 
регулирующие органы Индии должны принимать очень строгие карательные меры для 
предотвращения подобных неэтичных практик. 
Kлючевые слова: мошенническая практика финансовой отчетности; компьютер Satyam; modus-operandi; 
финансовая отчетность; корпоративное управление; аудиторы; судебно-бухгалтерская экспертиза; 
корпоративная культура и этика; SEBI; SFIO; CID; Индия. 
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